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The Determinants of Fair Value Measurements of Banks: International Evidence 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the accounting choice decisions of banks to employ 
Level 3 inputs in estimating the value of their financial assets and liabilities. Using a sample of 
146 bank-year observations from 18 countries over 2009-2012, this study finds banks’ 
incentives to use Level 3 valuation inputs are associated with both firm-level and country-level 
determinants. At the firm-level, leverage, profitability (in term of net income), Tier 1 capital 
ratio, size and audit committee independence are associated with the percentage of Level 3 
valuation inputs. At the country-level, economy development, legal region, legal enforcement 
and investor rights are also associated with the Level 3 classification choice. Lastly, ‘secrecy’, 
the proxy for culture dimensions and values, is found to be positively associated with the use of 
Level 3 valuation inputs. Altogether, these findings suggest that banks use the discretion 
available under Level 3 inputs opportunistically to avoid violating debt covenants limits, to 
increase earnings and manage their capital ratios. Results of this study also highlight that 
corporate governance quality at the firm-level (e.g. audit committee independence) and 
institutional features can constrain banks’ opportunistic behaviors in using the discretion 
available under Level 3 inputs. The results of this study have important implications for 
standard setters and contribute to the debate on the use of fair value accounting in an 
international context. 
 
 
 
Key words: Fair value measurement; Fair value hierarchy; Accounting choice 
JEL classification: M40, M41 
 
 
1 
The Determinants of Fair Value Measurements of Banks: International Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
The choices with respect to the requirements of fair value measurement to disclose a fair value 
hierarchy provides an opportunity for an accounting choice study. As Ball (2006) highlights 
that a major feature of IFRS accounting standards is the extent of the use of fair value 
accounting. A consequence of the enhanced use of fair value accounting, in particular ‘mark-to 
model’ rather than ‘mark-to-market’, is the ‘discretionary’ nature of fair value accounting in 
specific contexts. In particular, the implication of fair value accounting requires very specific 
conditions such as well-developed and liquid capital markets. Under IFRS 13 Fair Value 
Measurement, the definition of fair value
1
 emphasises that if the liquid markets do not exist for 
orderly transactions, then fair values have to be measured based on managerial assumptions 
and models (e.g. Level 3 inputs).  IFRS 13 seeks to “increase consistency and comparability in 
fair value measurements and related disclosures through a 'fair value hierarchy'. The hierarchy 
categorises the inputs used in valuation techniques into three levels. The hierarchy gives the 
highest priority to (unadjusted) quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities 
and the lowest priority to unobservable inputs. [IFRS 13:72]” 
As part of the IASB's response to the global financial crisis and convergence project 
between IFRS and FASB, in March 2009, the IASB issued Improving Disclosures about 
Financial Instruments (Amendments to IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures). IFRS 7 
requires reporting entities to disclose the fair values based on a ‘Three-Level’ hierarchy in 
                                                             
1 Fair value is defined as ‘the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.’ 
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order to provide financial statements users with useful information about valuations, 
methodologies and the uncertainty associated with fair value measurements. Level 1 and 2 
measurements include observable and indirectly observable inputs such as quoted prices of 
identical or comparable assets or liabilities from active markets. However, Level 3 
measurements include unobservable inputs computed by using price models or discounted cash 
flow methodologies or other information reflecting reporting entity’s own assumptions and 
judgments. As fair value estimates based on Level 3 inputs are uncertain, IFRS 7 requires 
entities to reconcile fair value measurements in Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy from the 
beginning balances to the ending balances on their realised and unrealised gains or losses. Also, 
any significant transfer between different levels must be disclosed. 
The empirical results generally confirm that managers use the discretion provided by fair 
value accounting opportunistically to increase the performance and cash flows (Chong, Huang 
& Zhang, 2012; Fiechter & Meryer, 2009 and Henry, 2009), to smooth earnings volatility 
(Barth et al., 1995; Hodder et al., 2006 and Li & Sloan, 2011), to meet analysts’ forecasts 
(Song,2008 and Fargher & Zhang, 2012) and to increase management’s compensations 
(Ramanna & Watts, 2009; Dechow et al., 2010; Shalev, Zhang & Zhang, 2010 and Livne, 
Markarian & Milne, 2011). Barth and Taylor (2010) call for more research to investigate the 
role of discretion in fair value estimates. Using the language of the fair value measurement 
hierarchy, Level 3 inputs are discretionary in nature. However, the incentives of bankers to use 
Level 3 inputs remain an empirical question. 
Using a sample that comprises 146 bank-year observations from 18 countries over 
2009-2012, this study investigates the firm-level and country-level factors that explain 
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managers’ incentives to use Level 3 valuation inputs. This study focuses on banks because 
banks have significant amounts of fair value assets and liabilities and they are among the 
strongest critics from 2008 global financial crisis. Regressing on 146 bank-year observations 
from the largest 50 non-US banks, this study finds that firm-level, country-level and culture 
factors are associated with banker’s classification choices on fair value measurements. At the 
firm-level, this study provides evidence that leverage and size are significantly and positively 
associated with the percentage of Level 3 inputs for valuing assets and liabilities. Furthermore, 
this study finds that better performing banks, measured by net income, are less likely to use 
Level 3 inputs. Moreover, the capital adequacy management incentive partially explains the 
choice of using Level 3 inputs. That is, banks with comparatively low Tier 1 capital ratios are 
more likely to measure their financial assets and liabilities based on Level 3 inputs. Results also 
provide evidence on the influence of corporate governance on the banks’ incentives to employ 
Level 3 valuation inputs, showing that audit committee independence is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of using Level 3 inputs. 
Consistent with the evidence of LaPorta et al., (1998)
2
, at the country-level, this study finds 
that economic development ( measured by per-capital GDP), common law legal system, legal 
enforcement, outsider investor rights are all negatively associated with the percentage of Level 
3 inputs for valuing assets and liabilities. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that culture 
dimensions also explains the bankers’ choice to use Level 3 inputs. Using Grey (1998)’s 
culture values scores, this study provide evidence that banks from countries that are more 
‘secrecy’- oriented are more likely to use Level 3 inputs. Altogether, these firm-level and 
                                                             
2 LaPorta et al., (1998) provide early evidence that countries with English common law legal systems tend to have: 
(1) better economic development and stronger capital markets, (2) stronger investor rights and (3) better legal 
enforcement as compared to code law countries. 
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country-level determinants suggest that banks use the discretion available when using Level 3 
inputs opportunistically. Additionally, because of the subjective nature of Level 3 inputs, banks 
are able to use Level 3 inputs to boost earnings and manage their capital ratios. Results of this 
study also show that corporate governance quality at the firm-level (e.g. audit committee 
independence) and institutional features can constrain banks’ opportunistic behaviors through 
Level 3 inputs. All results remain unchanged in robustness tests. 
The results contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, the results can be used 
as an input into the debate on the role of fair value accounting. Prior studies focus on the value 
relevance of Level 3 inputs (Song et al., 2010) without exploring the potential managerial 
incentives to use Level 3 inputs. This study fills the gap and adds to the body of knowledge on 
accounting choice literature in the context of fair value measurements. Secondly, this study 
documents the significant role of institutional characteristics and culture dimensions on 
accounting choice. As shown in this study, banks from less-developed countries are more 
likely to use Level 3 inputs. This can have a substantial impact on accounting quality. Those 
countries (such as China and Brazil in this study) have less liquid capital markets on which fair 
value estimates can be based and they have poor legal enforcement and investors from such 
countries have fewer rights against insiders (e.g. managers and directors). Therefore, if 
financial institutions are able to use the discretion available under Level 3 inputs for earnings 
and capital adequacy managements, the consequences on investors can be severe. Last, results 
from this study provide valuable inputs to the accounting standard setters, reinforcing the 
evidence (Ball, 2006) already available that adoption of uniform accounting standards, without 
considering the institutional features, will not be able to significantly improve accounting 
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quality or change the financial reporting incentives. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional 
background. Section 3 reviews relevant prior research and develops hypotheses. Section 4 
outlines the models and describes the variables. Section 5 provides details on the sample 
selection procedures. Section 6 presents the analysis of the results. Section 7 summarises the 
robustness tests. Section 8 provides concluding comments and addresses limitations of the 
study. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) began its work on financial 
instruments in 1988 and the subject has remained on the active international standard-setting 
agenda ever since. IASC released International Accounting Standard 32 (IAS 32) Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation in 1995. That was an initial standard dealing with 
the presentation and disclosure issues on financial instruments. After a prolonged period of 
increased effort, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was issued in 
1999 to deal with the recognition and other measurement issues that have not been covered in 
IAS 32. In 2002, in response to practice issues identified in the IAS 39 implementation 
guidance process by audit firms, national standard setters, regulators and others, the IASB 
proposed changes to both IAS 32 and IAS 39. It issued revised versions of those standards in 
December 2003. In August 2005, the IASB expanded the disclosure aspects of IAS 32 and IAS 
39 by issuing International Financial Reporting Standard 7 (IFRS 7) Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures, incorporating disclosure requirements under FAS 157.  
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Fair value, under IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement is defined as ‘the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants at the measurement date.’ The definition emphasises that fair value is more a 
market-based measurement than an entity-specific measurement. Thus, fair values may be 
determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in valuing the asset or 
liability. 
As part of the IASB's response to the global financial crisis, in March 2009, the IASB 
issued ‘Improving Disclosures about Financial Instruments (Amendments to IFRS 7 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures)’. IFRS 7 requires reporting entities to disclose fair values based on a 
Three-Level measurement hierarchy in order to provide financial statements users with useful 
information about valuations, methodologies and the uncertainty associated with fair value 
measurements. While Level 1 measurement includes observable inputs such as quoted prices 
of identical assets or liabilities from active markets, Level 2 measures include indirectly 
observable inputs such as quoted prices of comparable assets and liabilities from active 
markets. However, there can be two sub-classes of Level 2 inputs. Ryan (2008, p.29) says:  
‘The first subclass is quoted market prices from similar assets traded in active markets. 
These measurements are considered to be less ideal than Level 1 inputs but still reliable as 
they are based on observable inputs which are less subjective. The second subclass is 
indirect inputs such as yield curves, exchange rates and empirical correlations. The 
second subclass input has lower quality than the first subclass of Level 2 inputs but is of 
higher quality than Level 3 inputs’.  
However, the far less precise Level 3 measures include unobservable inputs computed 
by using price models or discounted cash flow methodologies or other information 
reflecting reporting entity’s own assumptions and judgments. These inputs are more 
subject to managements’ manipulations, and involve more information risks to whom the 
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financial statements are presented. The IASB limits the use of Level 3 inputs to only when 
inputs from Level 1 and Level 2 are not available. 
As fair value estimates based on Level 3 inputs are subject to a lot of estimations, IFRS 7 
requires additional disclosures in relation to Level 3 assets and liabilities. Specifically, for fair 
value measurements in Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, entities need a reconciliation from 
the beginning balances to the ending balances, disclosing separately changes during the period 
attributable to the following: (a) total gains or losses for the period recognised in profit or loss, 
and a description of where they are presented in the statement(s) of profit or loss and other 
comprehensive income; (b) purchases, sales, issues and settlements (each type of movement 
disclosed separately); and (c) transfers into or out of Level 3 (e.g. transfers attributable to 
changes in the observability of market data) and the reasons for those transfers. In addition, for 
fair value measurements in Level 3, if changing one or more of the inputs to reasonably 
possible alternative assumptions would change fair value significantly, the entity shall state 
that fact and disclose the effect of those changes. The entity shall disclose how the effect of a 
change to a reasonably possible alternative assumption was calculated (e.g. Level 3 sensitivity 
analysis)
3
.  
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The issue of reliability with fair values rises from the measurement uncertainty. The fair 
value estimates, especially for Level 3 assets, are heavily reliant on valuation estimation 
models and assumptions, which may result in unintentional and intentional bias. For example, 
                                                             
3 See Appendix A from a sample bank’s disclosure on fair value hierarchy. 
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Benston (2008, p. 106) claimed that ‘dishonest and opportunistic CFOs and CEOs are likely to 
find fair value accounting a boon to their efforts to manipulate reported net income.’ Several 
empirical studies have evidenced deliberate managerial bias in fair value accounting (Dietrich 
et al., 2000; Hodder, Mayew, McAnally & Weaver, 2006; Danbolt & Rees, 2008; Ramanna, 
2008). In addition, previous studies have supported the argument that assessing the fair market 
value involves subjectivity. Hence, a high degree of judgment is required when measuring fair 
value estimates. More generally, the demand for fair value has to be evaluated in its specific 
country context. For example, countries should have specific conditions such as liquid markets 
and a large database of available prices for firms to adopt fair value accounting (Barth & 
Landsman, 1995; Ball, 2006).  
3.1 Accounting Choices: Firm-level Determinants 
Fields et al., (2001, p. 260) define an accounting choice as: ‘any decision whose primary 
purpose is to influence (either in form or substance) the output of the accounting system in a 
particular way, including not only financial statements published in accordance with GAAP, 
but also tax returns and regulatory filings, contracting, asset pricing, taxes, and regulations’. 
The topic of accounting choice has been extensively studied by researchers in prior studies. 
The foundation studies of accounting choice are offered by Watts & Zimmerman (1978) and 
Holthausen (1990) (see also Fields et al., 2001 for a review). These studies provide early 
evidence that accounting choices are determined by (a) contractual efficiency (agency costs), 
(b) information asymmetry and (c) managerial opportunism reasons (Quagli & Avallone, 
2010). 
In contrast to normative accounting theory that prescribes the accounting method that 
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companies should be adopting, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed Positive Accounting 
Theory (PAT) in an attempt to explain why certain companies choose specific accounting 
choices over others. Positive accounting theory assumes that management’s incentives are the 
main determinants of accounting choices. Under the opportunistic perspective of positive 
accounting theory, management is expected to choose an accounting option that will meet their 
wealth maximisation objectives. Thus, certain firm characteristics could possibly determine 
management’s decisions, such as a bonus plan, leverage and company size. It is hypothesised 
that management will choose an income increasing choice that could positively affect their 
compensation and avoid the violation of debt covenants, whereas in order to avoid political 
costs and political visibility, management is expected to choose income decreasing accounting 
methods. Following the discussions above, this study develops the firm-level determinants 
hypotheses based on positive accounting theory:  
  
Leverage 
Although large banks may prefer to show lower income, many banks would prefer to show 
higher income. One of the three main hypotheses of positive accounting theory is the debt 
hypothesis that explains the impact of company’s leverage ratio on accounting choices. Mostly, 
debt covenants require borrowers to maintain a minimum level of debt-to-equity, interest 
coverage or working capital. Borrowers will incur costs if debt covenants requirements are 
violated. Under IFRS 7, realised and unrealised gains or losses from Level 3 financial assets 
and liabilities will influence the income statements, which will ultimately affect the 
calculations of convenant ratios. According to agency theory, firms with high leverage ratios, 
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especially those that have almost reached the debt covenant limit, are more likely to use Level 
3 valuation inputs because increasing reported net income will reduce the probability of default. 
These arguments lead to hypothesis two: 
H1: Bank’s leverage ratio is positively associated with the percentage of Level 3 financial 
assets and liabilities. 
 
Performance 
Performance is another determinant of accounting choice. Prior studies provide evidence that 
manipulating loan loss provisions and write-offs has been the commonly-used way by banks to 
either meet earnings targets or to avoid earnings decreases and losses. For instance, Henry 
(2009) shows that early adopters elect the fair value option in a manner that systematically 
improves their income statements in the adoption quarter. Song (2008) finds that the 
transitional provisions with respect to the application of the fair value option (in accordance 
with FAS 159) are used to remove accumulated losses on investment securities. In addition, 
Song (2008) finds that banks report earnings higher than target by managing them with the fair 
value option. Beatty, Ke & Petroni (2002) provide evidence that the earnings incentive is more 
pronounced for public banks that report more small earnings increases and less earnings 
decreases.  
Moreover, studies have also provided empirical evidence that bank managers manipulate 
earnings through realised or unrealised gains and losses from financial instruments. Following 
the application of FAS 157 in the US, a recent study by Fietcher, Myers & Shakspeare (2009) 
examines whether the discretion available in the use of fair value measurement is used for the 
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purpose of big bath accounting during the financial crisis. Based on a sample of 552 US bank 
holding companies and hand-collected data on unrealised Level 3 gains or losses for the time 
period from Q1 2008 to Q1 2009, they find that banks exhibiting poor pre-managed 
performance levels report significantly higher discretionary Level 3 losses. Furthermore, these 
banks are more likely to switch in the subsequent quarter from non-managed negative earnings 
to reported positive earnings, which is consistent with the big bath hypothesis. Dechow, Myers 
& Shakspeare (2010) provide evidence that firms with low pre-managed earnings or negative 
changes in earnings report more gains on securitised receivables at fair values. Results from 
these studies suggest that managers manipulate the fair value of instruments to meet earnings 
targets or to avoid losses. Level 3 valuations provide managers with discretions to boost 
earnings because unrealised gains on Level 3 financial assets increase reported earnings. 
Therefore, banks can opportunistically choose to classify more financial assets as Level 3 for 
earnings management purposes. That is, poorly performing banks are more like to use Level 3 
valuations to increase their reported earnings. Thus, it is hypothesed that: 
H2: Bank performance is negatively associated with the percentage of Level 3 financial assets 
and liabilities. 
 
Capital Adequacy 
Capital adequacy is the major indication of the financial strength and long-term viability of 
a bank. Following the global financial crisis and failures of financial institutions, managing 
capital adequacy has been a core task for banks’ management. Failure to meet capital adequacy 
requirements can be costly for banks and lead to mandatory sanctions by regulators. The 
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findings of extant literature suggest that maintaining a satisfactory capital adequacy ratio has 
been one of the main incentives for bank managers to engage in earnings management. For 
instance, using the discretion available under the loan loss provisions and charge-offs is found 
to be a favourable way to manage capital adequacy by banks. An early study by Moyer (1990) 
examines a commercial bank manager's incentives to reduce regulatory costs imposed when 
the bank's capital adequacy ratio falls below its regulatory minimum. Results are consistent 
with the hypotheses that banks use the discretion available under loan loss provisions to 
manage capital adequacy ratios. Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) find that both loan 
loss provisions and charge-offs are used to manage capital ratios.
4
 Evidence outside the US 
was provided by Chen & Daley (1996) who report a consistent result that Canadian banks 
manage their capital through loan loss reserves similar to the US banks. 
Two recent studies provide empirical evidence that banks manage capital ratios by 
increasing the income components (Karaoglu, 2005 and Huizingga & Laeven, 2009). 
Accordingly, manipulating the estimated Level 3 fair values can have economically 
meaningful consequences for capital management purposes because unrealised gains from 
Level 3 financial assets will be increasing the net income components on financial statements. 
Therefore, bank managers can maintain capital ratios by reporting a higher level of Level 3 
assets or transferring Level 1 and Level 2 into Level 3, providing managers with a higher 
degree of discretion when estimating the fair values. Thus, these arguments lead to following 
hypotheses: 
H3: Bank capital ratio is negatively associated with the percentage of Level 3 financial assets 
                                                             
4 Similar results are also documented in Ahmed, Takeda & Thomas (1999), Scholes, Wilson & Walfson (1990) 
and Collins, Shackelford &Whalen (1995). 
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and liabilities. 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
The perceived reliability of fair value estimates is dependent on the level of discretion 
management has over the valuation process. Level 3 financial assets and liabilities are based on 
unobservable inputs, resulting in unintentional measurement bias or even intentional bias from 
earnings management (Martin et al., 2006). The audit committee’s main responsibility is to 
ensure the reliability and quality of financial reporting. Arguably, the composition of the audit 
committee plays a significant role in constraining the management’s opportunistic behaviour 
with respect to fair value estimates. For instance, studies provide evidence that the 
independence of the audit committee is negatively associated with the occurrence of 
restatements and fraud (Abbott et al., 2006 and Dechow et al., 1996), aggressive earnings 
management (Bedard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002b and Zhou & Chen, 2004). This study expects 
that managers will make use of the discretion available under Level 3 valuation inputs for 
earnings management purposes. The incentives for using Level 3 inputs are constrained by the 
strength of the corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, 
H4: The independence of audit committee members is negatively associated with the 
percentage of Level 3 financial assets and liabilities. 
 
3.3 Institutional Determinants of Financial Reporting Incentives 
An emerging literature investigates how the institutional factors can affect the actual financial 
reporting incentives of financial statement preparers (Ball, Kothari & Robin 2000; Ball, Robin 
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& Wu, 2003; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003; Ball, Robin & Sadka, 2006; and Shen & Chih, 
2005). This literature suggests that the actual reporting behaviour is endogenous. That is, the 
actual reporting incentives are jointly determined with the country’s real economic and 
political factors. The relevance of this literature to IFRS implementation is that merely 
adopting an exogenously-developed set of accounting standards is unlikely to materially 
change firms’ actual reporting behaviour. Ball (2006, p.18) argues that given that  
‘uniform accounting would only occur under perfectly integrated world markets and 
political systems  ….adopting uniform international standards would have some, but 
limited, success in overcoming national differences in the real economic and political 
factors that determine actual practice, and hence in reducing differences in financial 
reporting practice’.  
Indeed, the demand for fair value and reliability of financial statements in common law 
countries can be different from the same demand in code law countries (Ball et al., 2000).
5
 The 
results from LaPorta (1998) provide evidence that countries with English common law legal 
systems tend to have: (1) better economic development and stronger capital markets, (2) 
stronger investor rights and (3) better legal enforcement than code law countries. 
The institutional differences between common-law and code-law countries in legal 
enforcement, economic development and investor protection have been applied into many 
recent accounting studies. For example, Ball et al. (2000) show that common-law accounting 
income exhibits significantly greater timeliness than code-law accounting income. The notion 
behind the results is that investors from common law countries are presumed as outsiders ‘at 
arm’s length’ from the company, and they rely on timely public disclosure and financial 
                                                             
5 Ball et al. (2006) summarises the distinct institutional features between common law countries and code law countries 
‘Common law takes its name from the process whereby laws originate and arises from what is commonly accepted to be 
appropriate practice. Common law originated in England and spread to its former colonies such as US, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. Whereas, code law also takes its name from the process whereby laws, are ‘coded’ in the public sector. Code law 
originated in Continental Europe and spread to the former colonies of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Politically powerful stakeholder groups necessarily are represented in both codifying and implementing rules in code law 
countries. Unlike code law, common law in its purest form makes standard-setting a private-sector responsibility’. 
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reporting. As a result, earnings are more volatile, more informative, and more closely-followed 
by investors and analysts in common law countries than in code law countries.  
The literature also suggests that institutional factors have a moderating effect on the 
earnings management. For instance, Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki (2003) examines systematic 
differences in earnings management across 31 countries. This study provides evidence that 
earnings management is decreasing in countries with strong investor protection because strong 
protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their 
incentives to mask firm performance. The results suggest an endogenous link between 
corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings. Similarly, Shen & Chih (2005) 
show that more than two-thirds of banks from 48 countries are found to have managed their 
earnings. In addition, they find that stronger protection of investors and greater transparency in 
accounting disclosure can reduce banks’ incentives to manage earnings. Also, market 
development, measured by real GDP per capita, decreases the degree of earnings management. 
Finally, stronger enforcement of laws can counterintuitively result in stronger earnings 
management. However, this effect appears in low-income countries only, and not in 
high-income countries. Based on a sample of firms from 42 countries, Francis and Wang (2008) 
find that earnings quality is higher in countries whose investor protection is stronger.  
To test the institutional determinants of fair value hierarchy classification choices, this 
study selects a number of institutional proxies that have good empirical grounding in the recent 
accounting literature such as law of region, legal enforcement, investor rights and market 
development (Ball, Kothari & Robin 2000; Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 
2003; Ball, Robin & Sadka, 2006; and Shen & Chih, 2005). Generally, economic development 
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and stronger capital markets, stronger investor rights and better legal enforcement can provide 
investors with some protections from the adverse effects of management discretion thus 
helping to reduce agency problems. However, Leuz et al (2003) also suggest a competing 
hypothesis, the penalty hypothesis that alternatively argues that ‘a strong legal environment 
encourages earnings management, because negative earnings incur an authority’s penalty. The 
insider thus has a greater incentive to hide a profit loss when faced with greater expected 
penalties. Therefore, earnings management increases with a strengthening of a country’s legal 
protection’ (Shen & Chih, 2005, p. 2679). Level 3 inputs are discretionary in nature. Based on 
the competing arguments, it is expected that the use of Level 3 inputs to measure financial 
assets and liabilities are associated with the development of capital markets, legal systems and 
enforcements and stronger investor protection. However, the direction is not predicted. Thus,  
H5: The institutional factors (capital market development, legal system and enforcement, 
outside investor rights) are associated with the use Level 3 inputs to measure their financial 
assets and liabilities.  
 
3.4 Does Culture Matter? 
Culture classification and the differences between them have long been postulated. Based 
on the data from more than 116,000 questionnaires answered by employees of a large 
multinational corporation in 72 countries, Hofstede (1980) found four factors can explain 
differences in nations’ cultural values: individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
and masculinity. Uncertainty avoidance measures the extent to which people in a culture feel 
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. Power distance is defined as ‘the extent to 
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which less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expectant 
accept that power is distributed unequally’. Individualism measures the importance of 
individuals versus groups in society. Masculinity measures the extent to which masculine-type 
attitudes are preferred over feminine-type attitudes in a society. Based on Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, Gray (1988) developed the four accounting value dimensions: statutory control 
versus professional regulation of accounting, uniformity versus flexibility of accounting rules, 
conservatism versus optimism in accounting measurement, and transparency versus secrecy in 
accounting disclosures.  
Using Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and/or Gray’s (1988) accounting value 
scores, recent studies provide evidence that culture dimensions and values are associated with 
the earnings quality. For example, Doupnik (2008) has examined the impact of national culture 
on earnings management using a sample from 31 countries. This study finds that cultural 
dimensions explain the variation in earnings management and income smoothing. Similarly, 
controlling for legal enforcement and outside investor rights measure per LaPorta et al. (1998), 
Braun and Rodriguez (2008) find a positive relationship between earnings management and 
Gray's (1988) accounting values of statutory control, uniformity, conservatism, and secrecy. 
Gray (1988) argues that the cultural dimensions identiﬁed by Hofstede (1980) can have an 
impact on a country’s accounting system either through their inﬂuence on a country’s 
institutions or through their inﬂuence on accounting values. The level of secrecy in a culture is 
particularly relevant in this study. Firms from countries with a higher secrecy level are likely to 
engage in more earnings management as the financial reporting is less transparent (e.g. to hide 
or avoid losses) in these countries (Leuz et al., 2003). Therefore, if a country ranks high in 
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secrecy, the accounting information system might provide a greater opportunity for earnings 
management. Accordingly, Level 3 valuations inputs are unobservable; as a result, banks from 
secrecy-orientated countries can engage in earnings management more easily, which leads to 
hypothesis 7:  
H6: Banks from countries with a higher secrecy orientation are more likely to use Level 3 
valuation inputs. 
 
4. Research Design and Sample: 
4.1 Research Design 
This study uses a pooled ordinary least squares regression model of the percentage of net 
financial assets classified as Level 3 (L3%) at each year end on proxies for constructs of 
interest (firm-level and country-level determinants) and the control variables. Equations below 
represent the empirical models this study estimates. Equation 1 includes only firm-level 
determinants. Equation 2-6 includes one of five country-level determinants, on at a time, into 
equation 1: 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit +b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit+ Fixed 
effects+e…………………………............................................................Equation (1) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6GDPit+ 
Fixed effects+e……………………………………………………….…..Equation (2) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6Commonit+ 
Fixed effects+e………………………………………………………...…..Equation (3) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit 
+b6LegalEnforcementit+Fixedeffects+e……………………………..…...Equation (4) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6InvestorRightsit+Fixed 
effects+e………………………………….……………………………….Equation (5) 
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L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6Secrecyit+ 
Fixed effects+e……………………………………………………….…..Equation (6) 
 
Dependent Variable
6
: 
Level of net financial assets classified as Level 3 (L3%) 
The dependent variable in all models is the percentage of net financial assets valued using 
Level 3 inputs (L3%). This variable is measured as net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of 
Level 3 assets minus fair values of Level 3 liabilities) divided by net fair value assets of Level 
1, Level 2 and Level 3. 
Firm-Level Independent Variables: 
Bank Size (LGTA): 
As discussed earlier, this study predicts that the bank size is positively associated with the 
level of net Level 3 financial assets. The proxy for bank size is total assets, which is measured 
as the log of total assets reported by the bank at year end. The coefficient b1 is expected to be 
positive. 
 
Financial Leverage (LEV): 
This study predicts that banks that have almost reached the debt covenant limit are more 
likely to classify their financial assets as Level 3, which will have a direct impact on the debt 
covenant ratios in order to reflect firms’ higher creditworthiness. Financial leverage is 
measured as total debts divided by total assets. The coefficient b2 is expected to be positive. 
Performance (NI): 
                                                             
6 Appendix B outlines the measurement of variables. 
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This study predicts poorly-performed banks are more likely to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management. Net income is used to proxy for a firm’s profitability 
and this study expects that there is a negative association between banks’ net income and the 
likelihood of using Level 3 inputs for valuing their financial assets and financial liabilities. 
Thus, b3 and b4 is expected to negative. 
Capital Adequacy (Tier1): 
This study uses banks’ Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratios (Tier1) to proxy for banks’ reporting 
incentives for their capital management. The Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio is calculated as 
the bank’s equity capital to total risk-weighted assets. The Tier 1 ratio is an important 
indication of the financial strength of financial intuitions. Thus, this study predicts that banks 
with higher Tier 1 capital ratios have fewer incentives to use Level 3 inputs to report 
opportunistically. This study employ the Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio from the prior year 
(t-1) in our analyses because it provides a better indication of the bank’s financial health at the 
beginning of the year, and therefore, a better indication of the bank’s incentives to report 
opportunistically during the current year. Tier 1 rations are downloaded from the Bankscope 
database and the coefficient b4 is expected to negative. 
 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI): 
Extant research provides evidence that an independent audit committee can reduce the agency 
costs. Audit committee independence is measured as the percentage of independent board of 
directors on the board of audit committee. The coefficient b5 is expected to be negative. 
Country-Level Independent Variables: 
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i. Per-capital GDP: Similar to Leuz et al., (2003), in order to ascertain whether fair value 
hierarchy classification choice is driven by a country’s economic development,  this study 
uses per-capita GDP as an explanatory variable, which is country’s average per-capita real 
GDP between 2009 and 2012. 
ii. Common is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 otherwise.  
iii. Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La 
Porta et al. (1998): (a) the efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, 
and (c) the corruption index. All three variables, range from 0 to 10.  
iv. Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). It is an 
aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to six. 
v. Secrecy is measured as a mathematical combination of Hofstede (1980) four cultural 
dimensions of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism and masculinity. 
Specifically, the secrecy score for each country is the sum of its ‘difference’ scores for 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance minus its ‘difference’ scores for individualism 
and masculinity (Braun & Rodriquez, 2008).  
 
Control Variables: 
Bank size is included as a control variable. As well, equations are estimated as a fixed 
effects model with year specific dummy variables to control for systematic time period effects 
and country dummies to provide additional controls for omitted variables that could affect the 
fair value hierarchy classification choice.  
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5. Sample  
The original sample is obtained from the Bankscope database, which comprises the top 50 
non-US banks worldwide that have adopted IFRS. The reason this study chooses non-US 
banks is to investigate any institutional factors that will determine the accounting choice. 
Previous studies mainly focus on US banks because of the data availability. Studying 
international banks contributes to the existing literature on accounting choice and international 
accounting standards adoption.  
All entities are mandatorily required to disclosure fair value hierarchy for their fair value 
measurements under the IFRS 7 - Financial instruments: disclosure. This study focuses only 
on the banking industry for the following reasons. Banks normally have significant amounts of 
fair value assets and liabilities which are applicable under IFRS 7 disclosure requirements and 
bank’s fair value measurements are usually more homogenous than firms in other industries. 
Thus, the fair value estimations and fair value hierarchy classification choices can have 
substantial direct impact on the banks’ earnings and its regulatory capital adequacy. Studying 
banks’ fair value measurement choices can contribute to the debate on the role of fair value 
accounting. In this study, the largest 50 non-US banks are chosen which offers the power to test 
the hypotheses. Fair value hierarchy disclosure requirements under IFRS 7 would be effective 
for banks from the 1
st
 January, 2009. Therefore, the sample period for this study starts from 
2009 until the end of 2012 inclusive.  
Each bank’s annual IFRS 7 disclosure information for 2009-2012 is hand-collected from 
their annual reports. All the financial information of those banks is downloaded from the 
bankscope database. Then, bank-year observations with missing values for any of test variables 
 
 
23 
have been excluded. Finally, observations that fall in the top and bottom 1% of variables have 
been eliminated. The finial sample for tests consists of 146 bank-year observations associated 
with 50 unique banks. The sample selection procedure is outlined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the relative size of fair value assets and liabilities 
from 146 bank-year observations over the sample periods (2009-2012). Compared to total 
assets and total liabilities, the mean of total assets and liabilities measured at the fair value are 
about 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively. The fair value amounts under Level 2 inputs 
account for most fair values, which is consistent with a few recent studies (Song et al, 2010). 
Specifically, 66% of fair valued assets and 86% of fair valued liabilities are classified as Level 
2. Whereas, only 5% fair valued assets and 8% fair valued liabilities are based on Level 3 
inputs. The mean of net Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 assets are 55%, 35% and 10% 
respectively. 
The descriptive statistics shows that the sample covers a wide range of banks. The mean of 
total assets of sample banks is USD 941525.35 million, ranging from a minimum of USD 
184298.14 million to a maximum of USD 2964299.20 million. On average, the companies in 
the sample have total liabilities of approximately 94% of their assets. In terms of the 
profitability of these banks, on average, the net income is USD 4560 million, which indicates 
that more than 50% of banks in the sample made an accounting profit. In addition, descriptive 
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statistics demonstrates that sample banks have a comparatively high Tier 1 regulatory ratio of 
10.76% on average, suggesting a strong debt pay-off ability of these banks. Lastly, in term of 
corporate governance, all banks are audited by Big4 firms
7
 and around 85% of the audit 
committee members are considered to be independent on average.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 illustrates the level of L3 assets and liabilities over the sample periods (2009-2012). 
The table shows that the percentage of Level 3 assets and liabilities has been gradually 
increasing over years in countries such as Australia, Canada, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden 
and Switzerland. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, in countries such as Brazil, China, 
Korea and Spain, there was a slightly increase in Level 3 assets and liabilities from 2009-2011 
followed by a sharp decrease in percentage of Level 3 assets and liabilities from 2011-2012. 
[Insert Table 3] 
In terms of the country-level variables, 5 sample countries are common law countries 
(Australia, Canada, UK, Ireland and Singapore), whereas 13 come from code law legal system. 
In general, the per-capital GDP shows that all European countries, Canada and Australia are 
well-developed countries. In addition, Singapore and Korea have comparative high per-capital 
GDP from the Asia region whereas China and Brazil have comparatively low per-capital GDP. 
The Switzerland (9.99), Sweden (9.92) and Netherlands (9.87) have the highest scores on the 
legal enforcement index, while China (4.77) and Brazil (6.52) have the lowest scores. Brazil 
(5), Canada (5) and UK (5) have the highest outside investor rights as per La Porta et al. (1998) 
                                                             
7 All sample banks are audited by Big 4. Thus, it is not included in the descriptive statistics as there are no 
variations across banks. 
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measure, whereas Belgium (0), Germany (1) and Italy (1) have the lowest outside investor 
protection index. For the national culture variable (Secrecy), Korea (46), Germany (29), Spain 
(20) and Italy (19) have the highest scores, while Austria (-75) and Sweden (-68) have the 
lowest scores based on Hofstede (1980) measure. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Pearson correlation coefficients on the variables used in each of the tests are presented in 
Table 5. L3% is positively correlated with determinants such as LGTA, LEV and Secrecy. It is 
negatively correlated with Tier 1, ACI and Outside Investor Rights as hypothesized (two tailed 
p-value 0.01 and 0.05 level). Correlation matrix  demonstrates that Common Law is strongly 
positively correlated with per-Capital GDP, Legal Enforcement and Investor rights, signifying 
that common law countries are well-developed countries whose laws are better enforced and 
investors are better protected (Ball et al, 2006).  
[Insert Table 5] 
 
6.2. Main analysis 
 
The results of the regression analyses for the pooled samples are presented in Table 6. The 
significance levels of individual coefficients are reported as two-tailed p-values. Column 1 
reports results from only firm-level variables to ensure that any finding is not affected by 
correlations with country-level variables incorporated in the model. The dependent variable in 
all models is the percentage of net financial assets valued using Level 3 inputs (L3%).  
Results provide support for hypothesis 1 that banks with high leverage ratios are more 
likely to classify their financial assets and liabilities as Level 3. The coefficient on LEV is 
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significantly positive (coefficient=0.321, t-stat=3.736) at 1% level. This result can be 
explained by debt hypothesis that highly levered banks are more likely to classify their 
financial assets as Level 3, which will have a direct impact on the debt covenant ratios, in order 
to reflect firms’ higher creditworthiness and to avoid the violation of debt covenant limit.  
Hypothesis 2 is also supported. That is, the incentive to classify financial assets and 
liabilities as Level 3 is negatively associated with the bank’s profitability. The coefficient on 
net income (NI) is negative (coefficient=-0.211, t-stat=-2.013), suggesting that better 
performing banks classify less percentage of fair valued assets based Level 3 inputs. In another 
word, profitable banks have less incentive to hide their losses to Level 3 assets. This is 
consistent with the result from a recent study by a recent study by Fietcher, Myers & Shakspear 
(2009) who find that poorly performing banks are more likely to report less unrealised losses 
from Level 3 assets in the period during which a negative earnings is reported.  
This study finds support for hypothesis 3. The coefficient on Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio 
(Tier1) is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.149, t-stat=-1.946) and the sign is consistent 
with the prediction. Banks with comparatively low capital ratios will face higher regulatory 
costs. The worse, failing to meet the capital adequacy requirements can lead to mandatory 
sanctions. This result provides evidence that Level 3 valuations provide managers with 
discretion to manage their capital ratios.  
Finally, in terms of the corporate governance variable, results suggest that Level 3 
classification choice is negatively (coefficient=-0.377, t-stat=-3.640) associated with the 
percentage of independent audit committee members. This findings support the importance of 
corporate governance in valuing Level 3 fair values which likely represent the values with 
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greatest information asymmetry and agency issues. 
When first three country-level variables: Capital market development (Per-capital GDP), 
Law, Legal Enforcement is added, one at a time, to the regression, the firm-level determinants 
remain unchanged. Results are presented in columns 2-4 of Table 6. First, the coefficient of the 
per-capita GDP are significant and negative (coefficient=-0.754, t-stat=-2.003), suggesting the 
fact that banks incentives to measure their fair value based on Level 3 inputs is partially 
affected by the country’s economic development. Second, the regression results show that L3% 
is negatively associated with Common Law and legal enforcement. Interestingly, when 
Outside Investor Rights is added, as shown in the Column 5 of Table 6, the coefficient on net 
income (NI) and Tier 1 become insignificant, suggesting a strong influence of investor 
protection on the choice to use Level 3 valuation inputs. 
The notion behind these findings is that, based on the agency theory, managers and 
controlling shareholders (insiders) have incentives to acquire private control benefits to meet 
their wealth maximum objectives. As discussed in this paper, Level 3 valuations are based on 
unobservable inputs which are highly subjective and less verifiable, providing bankers with 
opportunities to mask the profit figures and manage capital ratios especially when active and 
liquid markets for financial assets do not exist. Results imply that legal systems, legal 
enforcements and investor protections are mechanisms to constrain mangers’ incentives to 
opportunistically choose accounting choices thus negative coefficients on these variables are 
found. These findings are consistent with a recent study by Leuz et al., (2003) who argue that, 
‘the ability of insiders to divert resources for their own benefit is limited by legal systems that 
protect the rights of outside investors. As outsiders can only take disciplinary actions against 
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insiders if outsiders detect the private benefits, insiders have an incentive to manipulate 
accounting reports in order to conceal their diversion activities’.  
Lastly, results presented in column 6 of Table 6 indicate that bankers are more likely to 
classify their fair valued assets and liabilities as Level 3 in countries that are Secrecy-oriented. 
It is note-worthy that when ‘secrecy’ is added, the adjusted R2 increases to 58.4%. This finding 
highlights the important influence of culture on accounting choices, which is also consistent 
with the prediction that secrecy-oriented countries tend to have higher information asymmetry 
and offers banks more opportunities for earnings managements as financial reporting in these 
countries is less transparent. 
[Insert Table 6] 
7. Additional Tests 
To ensure that smaller countries with fewer observations do not drive the results, models 
have been re-estimated excluding those having only four or eight firm-year observations. The 
results (not reported) are similar to the results reported in Table 6 both in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance on both the firm- and country-level determinants. Furthermore, the 
results remain valid even after excluding countries with the highest number of observations 
(China, Canada and France). The coefficients on variables of interest in all models are 
statistically significant (two tailed p-value 0.01 or 0.05). 
 
8. Concluding Comments 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors influencing banks’ decisions to employ 
Level 3 inputs in estimating the value of their financial assets and liabilities. Using a sample of 
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146 bank-year observations from 18 countries over 2009-2012, this study finds banks’ 
incentives to use Level 3 valuation inputs are associated with firm-level determinants such as 
leverage, profitability (in term of net income), Tier 1 capital ratio and audit committee 
independence and bank size; and country-level determinants, such as, economy development, 
legal region, legal enforcement and investor rights explain the Level 3 classification choice by 
banks. Lastly, ‘secrecy’, the proxy for culture dimensions and values, is found to be positively 
associated with the use of Level 3 valuation inputs. 
The results of this study have important implications to standard setters and contribute to 
the debate on the use of fair value accounting. While the use of fair value accounting increases 
‘true and fair’ disclosures, it may also provide an avenue for earnings management, especially 
when liquid markets do not exist (e.g. Level 3 inputs). In addition, adopting the uniform 
accounting standards can be beneficial to adopters as research shows adoption IFRS increases 
the comparability and reduces costs of capital. However, merely adoption of the uniform 
accounting standards. without considering the institutional features, will not be able to 
significantly improve accounting quality and can provide opportunities for earnings 
management. As shown in this study, banks from the less-developed countries, such as China 
and Brazil, are more likely to use Level 3 inputs but those countries have less liquid markets 
and poor legal enforcement and investors of such countries have fewer rights against insiders 
(e.g. managers and directors). Therefore, if financial institutions are able to use the discretion 
available under Level 3 inputs for earnings and capital adequacy managements, the benefits of 
adopting IFRS will be off-set by the consequences from opportunistic behaviour.  
This study has some limitations. For example, this study focuses on top 50 non-US banks 
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which are larger and have better performance than smaller banks. Thus, the results of this study 
might not be generalisable to smaller banks. Also, this study is exploratory in nature and needs 
to be expanded using a much larger sample of banks. Future research can explore other 
determinants of the choice to use Level 3 valuation inputs and adds knowledge to the existing 
literature on fair value accounting and measurement. 
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Appendix A: An example of the quantitative disclosures on fair value hierarchy under 
IFRS 7 by Deutsche Bank from 2012. 
 
(a) Carry value of the financial instruments based on 3-level fair value measurement hierarchy: 
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(b): Reconciliation of financial instruments classified in Level 3: 
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Appendix B: Measurement of Variables 
 
Variable: Measurement: 
L3% net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of 
Level 3 assets minus fair values of Level 3 
liabilities) divided by net fair value assets 
of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 
LGTA natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV the ratio of total debts over total assets 
NI net income after tax 
Tier 1 the ratio of tier 1capital to total 
risk-weighted assets 
ACI the percentage of independent board of 
directors on the board of audit committee 
Per-capital GDP country’s average per-capita real GDP 
between 2009 and 2012 
Common a dummy variable, 1 for a common law 
country and 0 otherwise 
Legal Enforcement the mean score across three legal variables 
used in La Porta et al. (1998): (a) the 
efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an 
assessment of rule of law, and (c) the 
corruption index. All three variables, 
range from 0 to 10 
Outside Investor Rights Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director 
rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). It 
is an aggregate measure of (minority) 
shareholder rights and ranges from zero to 
six 
Secrecy the sum of its ‘difference’ scores for 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance 
minus its ‘difference’ scores for 
individualism and masculinity 
Fixed effects Year dummy variables and Country 
dummy variables 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
Original Sample ( bank-year observations) 200 
Less:  
Missing values on dependent and independent variables 30 
Top and bottom 1% of control variables 24 
Number of observations used in the tests 146 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for firm-level regression variables 
 
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. 1
st
 Quartile Median 3
rd
  
Quartile 
Total Assets (USD: 
Million) 
941525.35 736233.50 358939.19 655318.53 1494084.55 
Leverage 0.94 0.02 0.93 0.94 0.95 
Net Income (USD: 
Million) 
4566.00 7407.09 1486.63 3284.84 6153.65 
Tier 1 10.76 2.07 9.33 10.55 12.18 
ACI 0.85 0.18 0.71 1.00 1.00 
FVA/TA 0.30 0.93 0.06 0.17 0.33 
L1 Assets% 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.47 
L2 Assets% 0.66 0.24 0.48 0.68 0.86 
L3 Assets% 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.04 
FVL/TL 0.19 0.65 0.01 0.09 0.22 
L1 Liabilities% 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.12 
L2 Liabilities% 0.86 0.42 0.79 0.90 0.96 
L3 Liabilities% 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Net L1 Assets 0.55 0.60 0.15 0.51 0.86 
Net L2 Assets 0.35 0.55 0.07 0.42 0.77 
Net L3 Assets 0.10 0.44 0.00 0.02 0.07 
Table two presents the descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables included in the tests. The full sample 
consists of 146 bank-year observations for the fiscal years 2009 to 2012 across 18 countries. Financial accounting 
information is obtained from the Bankscope Database. Fair value measurement hierarchy information is 
hand-collected from the annual reports. Firm size is measured as total US$ assets (in millions); Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of total debts over total assets; Net income is measured as net income after tax (in millions); 
Tier 1 is measured as the ratio of tier 1capital to total risk-weighted assets; Audit committee independence is 
measured as the percentage of independent board of directors on the board of audit committee; FVA/TA is 
calculated as the total fair valued assets over total assets; L1 Assets%, L2 Assets% and L3 Assets% are measured 
as total Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 assets divided by total fair valued assets, respectively; FVL/TL is calculated 
as the total fair valued liabilities over total liabilities; L1 Liabilities%, L2 Liabilities% and L3 Liabilities% are 
measured as total Level 1, Level2 and Level 3 liabilities divided by total fair valued liabilities, respectively; Net 
L1 Assets Net L2 Assets Net L3 Assets are calculated as net Level 1, net Level 2 and net Level 3 assets divided by 
net fair valued assets, respectively. 
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Table 3: The extent of the use of  Level 3 assets and liabilities over the sample period 
(2009-2012) 
 
 
Table three illustrates the level of Level 3 assets and liabilities over the sample periods (2009-2012). L3A is 
measured as Level 3 assets divided by total net fair value assets; L3L is measured as Level 3 liabilities divided by 
total net fair value assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  L3A L3L L3A L3L L3A L3L L3A L3L 
1 Austria 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
2 Australia 0.0075 0.0025 0.005 0.0025 0.01 0.00 0.012 0.006 
3 Belgium 0.155 0.14 0.175 0.155 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.12 
4 Brazil 0.04 0 0.08 0 0.18 0 0.07 0 
5 Canada 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.03 0.034 0.042 0.04 0.06 
6 China 0.022 0.135 0.05 0.183 0.01 0.178 0.013 0.198 
7 France 0.088 0.018 0.104 0.02 0.046 0.028 0.108 0.036 
8 Germany 0.02 0.005 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.015 0.04 0.02 
9 Ireland 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.02 0 
10 Italy 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.015 0.035 0.015 0.045 0.035 
11 Netherlands 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 
12 Norway 0.18 0 0.17 0 0.28 0 0.01 0 
13 Korea 0.34 0.53 0.07 0.46 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.33 
14 Singapore 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15 Spain 0.1925 0.2325 0.1975 0.235 0.0175 0 0.01 0 
16 Sweden 0.0075 0.005 0.0125 0.0075 0.015 0.025 0.0125 0.005 
17 Switzerland 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
18 UK 0.025 0.0125 0.032 0.015 0.03 0.017 0.0325 0.015 
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Table 4: Summary of country-level variables 
 
 Country Per-capital 
GDP 
(2009-2012) 
Common 
Law 
Legal 
Enforcement 
Outside 
Investor 
Rights 
Secrecy 
1 Austria 36277 0 9.47 4 -75 
2 Australia 35058.25 1 9.30 4 -14 
3 Belgium 35576.75 0 9.49 0 8 
4 Brazil 5734.5 0 6.52 5 -3 
5 Canada 31400.25 1 9.58 5 -19 
6 China 4013.75 0 4.77 3 -4 
7 France 32654 0 8.97 3 -10 
8 Germany 32532.5 0 9.37 1 29 
9 Ireland 38646.5 1 8.74 4 5 
10 Italy 26894.75 0 7.95 1 19 
11 Netherlands 37246.75 0 9.87 2 -49 
12 Norway 77162.5 0 9.76 2 -42 
13 Korea 20161.25 0 6.71 2 46 
14 Singapore 35534 1 8.99 4 -35 
15 Spain 23745.75 0 7.87 4 20 
16 Sweden 41076.75 0 9.92 3 -68 
17 Switzerland 38646.5 0 9.99 2 -18 
18 UK 38646.5 1 9.40 5 -23 
The table 4 presents the country-level variables of interest. Per-capital GDP is country’s average per-capita real 
GDP between 2009 and 2012 (in UD dollars); Common is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 
otherwise; Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. 
(1998): (a) the efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, and (c) the corruption index. All 
three variables, range from 0 to 10; Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to six; Secrecy is 
measured as the sum of its ‘difference’ scores for uncertainty avoidance and power distance minus its ‘difference’ 
scores for individualism and masculinity. 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 shows the correlations between variables. L3% is measured as net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of Level 3 assets minus fair values of Level 3 liabilities) divided 
by net fair value assets of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3; Firm size (LGTA) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets ; Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of total 
debts over total assets; Net income (NI) is measured as net income after tax; Tier 1 is measured as the ratio of tier 1capital to total risk-weighted assets; Audit committee 
independence (ACI) is measured as the percentage of independent board of directors on the board of audit committee; Per-capital GDP is country’s average per-capita real 
GDP between 2009 and 2012; Common is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 otherwise; Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal 
variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (a) the efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, and (c) the corruption index. All three variables, range from 
0 to 10; Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to 
six; Secrecy is measured as the sum of its ‘difference’ scores for uncertainty avoidance and power distance minus its ‘difference’ scores for individualism and masculinity. 
***=significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test), **=significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 
  L3% LGTA LEV NI Tier 1 ACI Per-capital 
GDP 
Common 
Law 
Legal 
Enforcement 
Investor 
Rights 
Secrecy 
L3% 1                     
LGTA .470*** 1                   
LEV .452*** .387*** 1                 
NI -.115 .324*** -.170** 1               
Tier 1 -.261*** -.042 -.147** .078 1             
ACI -.294*** -.418*** -.162** -.321*** .168** 1           
Per-capital 
GDP 
.123 .013 .281*** -.412*** .105 .328*** 1         
Common Law -.012 -.164** -.043 -.205*** .156** .485*** .300*** 1       
Legal 
Enforcement 
.103 -.090 .149** -.385*** .156** .394*** .873*** .400*** 1     
Investor Rights -.183** -.255*** -.035 -.028 .161* .330*** -.084 .665*** .085 1   
Secrecy .149** .100 -.248*** .003 -.100 -.238*** -.396*** -.190*** -.399*** -.324*** 1 
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Table 6: Regressions using pooled sample for testing the firm- and country-level determinants of L3% 
 
Variable  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
 Coefficient 
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient 
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient 
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient 
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient 
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient 
(p-value) 
T-stat 
Constant -9.429*** -4.855 -10.509*** -5.273 -8.181*** -4.344 11.111* 1.866 -4.246** -2.125 -8.178*** -4.688 
LGTA 0.475*** 5.047 0.495*** 5.292 0.465*** 5.180 0.465*** 5.181 0.385*** 4.442 0.432*** 5.136 
LEV 0.321*** 3.736 0.363*** 4.152 0.262*** 3.132 0.262*** 3.132 0.325*** 4.186 0.266*** 3.452 
NI -0.211** -2.013 -0.222** -2.138 -0.226*** -2.252 -0.226*** -2.253 -0.125 -1.302 -0.073 -0.763 
Tier 1 -0.149** -1.946 -0.145** -1.913 -0.142** -1.938 -0.142** -1.939 -0.035 -0.485 -0.166*** -2.429 
ACI -0.377*** -3.640 -0.346*** -3.340 -0.308*** -3.064 -0.308*** -3.065 -0.334*** -3.558 -0.189*** -1.937 
Per-capital 
GDP 
  -0.754** -2.003         
Common  
Law 
    -1.326*** -3.630       
Legal 
Enforcement 
      -16.557*** -3.630     
Outside 
Investor Rights 
        -2.813*** -5.313   
Secrecy           1.505*** 5.695 
Year Dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Country Dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
N 146  146  146  146  146  146  
Adjusted R
2 0.476  0.489  0.524  0.524  0.572  0.584  
The table 6 presents the results from the regression analysis. The dependent variable of all models is L3% which is measured as net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of Level 3 assets minus fair 
values of Level 3 liabilities) divided by net fair value assets of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3; Firm size (LGTA) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets ; Leverage (LEV) is measured as the 
ratio of total debts over total assets; Net income (NI) is measured as net income after tax; Tier 1 is measured as the ratio of tier 1capital to total risk-weighted assets; Audit committee independence 
(ACI) is measured as the percentage of independent board of directors on the board of audit committee; Per-capital GDP is country’s average per-capita real GDP between 2009 and 2012; Common 
is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 otherwise; Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (a) the efficiency of 
the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, and (c) the corruption index. All three variables, range from 0 to 10; Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et 
al. (1998). It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to six; Secrecy is measured as the sum of its ‘difference’ scores for uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance minus its ‘difference’ scores for individualism and masculinity. ***=significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test), **=significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test
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